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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF QUANTITATIVE
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I
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has no guidelines for the development,
presentation, and evaluation of statistical evidence by litigators or administrative
law judges in deceptive advertising cases.' As a result, Commission opinions and
evidentiary findings related to statistical testimony run to hundreds of pages, dis-
couraging the most determined reader, while orders emerging from the decisions
are vague as to their implications for statistical proof of a "reasonable basis" for
making an advertising claim. Statistical evidence is nothing new to the hearing
examiners, who were considering quantitative arguments in both unfair competi-
tion 2 and unfair trade practice 3 cases even before Title VII came into effect,4
which gave rise to the tremendous growth in quantitative analysis in employment
discrimination law. The increasing sophistication of lawyers, who are growing
accustomed to complex tools of statistical inference in discrimination cases, 5 and
changes in the law, particularly in the commercial speech area, suggests that an
examination of the process by which litigators present and judges evaluate quanti-
tative evidence is appropriate. 6
The elevation of commercial speech to a constitutionally protected status
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1. By comparison, the Food and Drug Administration at least indicates in its regulations what it
considers to be methodologically sound statistical support for product claims. See infra text accompanying
notes 13-18.
2. Diamond Alkali Co., 72 F.T.C. 700 (1967).
3. Stauffer Laboratories, Inc., 64 F.T.C. 629 (1974), afd, 343 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1965).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
5. Practitioners' handbooks devoted exclusively to the use of statistical proof in discrimination have
appeared. Ste, e.g., D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980); W. CON-
NOLLY & D. PETERSON, USE OF STATISTICS IN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY LITIGATION (1980).
6. Concerned litigators have inaugurated efforts to reform pretrial discovery and practice procedures
in order to facilitate complex litigation. The association of the Bar of the City of New York, for instance,
has appointed a Special Committee on Empirical Data in Legal Decision Making which has drafted Recom-
mendations Concerning the Management of Complex Cases with Substantial Data. Special Committee on Empirical
Data in Legal Decision-Making, Recommendations Concerning the Management of Complex Cases with
Substantial Data (Draft, Oct. 7, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Data Committee Recommendations]. This
draft follows the spirit of the evidentiary "protocols" suggested for use in administrative tribunals in M.
FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW 232-47 (1978).
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might be interpreted as requiring that those seeking to enjoin commercial speech
bear a heavy burden of proof in showing that it is misleading or deceptive to a
substantial number of consumers in order to overcome the constitutional presump-
tion in favor of its free flow. Commentators in the deceptive advertising area are
undecided whether the decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Vrginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc. 7 constrains FTC decisionmaking authority under section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act,8 presumably because the FTC authority is
directed specifically at that area of commercial speech, deceptive or misleading
advertising, that the Supreme Court leaves open to state and, presumably, federal
regulation.9 The Court recognized that "the greater objectivity and hardiness of
commercial speech may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for
fear of silencing the speaker"' 0 and that "[s]ince advertising is the sine qua non of
commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regula-
tion and foregone entirely."'"
Restrictions on all speech, however, must serve a "substantial" governmental
interest. 12 Proper enforcement of restrictions on speech, designed to ensure that
"the stream of commercial information flow[s] cleanly as well as freely," 13 might
be construed as requiring a balancing of the constitutional interest in free speech
against the governmental interest in truthful advertising in instances when a par-
ticular advertisement informs some consumers and misleads others. Even con-
ceding that ensuring the clean flow of commercial speech promotes a substantial
governmental interest and that the FTC regulations are no more extensive than
necessary to serve that interest, an advertisement that is otherwise lawful must
nevertheless be proved to be misleading before its constitutional protection is
removed. 14
To avoid casting off constitutional protection lightly, courts might require
clear and convincing proof of the misleading character of speech before enjoining
it. Concurring in Virginia Pharmacy, Justice Stewart suggested that the extension of
constitutional protection to commercial speech "calls into immediate question the
constitutional legitimacy of every state and federal law regulating false or decep-
tive advertising."' 5 The Third Circuit has echoed these sentiments stating:
"[D]oubtless the Commission's broad construction of its § 5 remedial authority
7. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
9. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72; Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978). Relevant commentary includes: Knapp, Commercial Speech, the
Federal Trade Commission, and the First Amendment, 9 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 1 (1978); Westen, The First Amend-
ment. Barner or Impetus to FTC Advertising Remedies?, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 487 (1980); Note, Corrective
Advertising and the Limits of Virginia Pharmacy, 32 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1979); Recent Development Note, First
Amendment Restri'ctons on the FTC's Regulation of Advertising, 31 VAND. L. REv. 349 (1978).
10. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 77 1-72 n.24.
11. Id
12. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
13. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772.
14. The requirements that (1) commercial speech concern lawful activity and not be misleading, (2)
the regulation serve a substantial governmental interest, and (3) the regulation be no more extensive than
necessary were announced by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
15. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 776 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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cannot survive the demise of the commercial speech exception to the first
amendment." 16
Greater clarity in the presentation, litigation, and evaluation of statistical evi-
dence and greater specificity in remedial orders with respect to the requisite statis-
tical bases for advertising claims are a logical part of the restructuring of deceptive
advertising regulations. Even without this constitutional shadow upon restraints
on speech by advertisers, the FTC, as a guardian of the competitive process, has an
incentive to ensure that the public welfare is served by the flow of commercial
information and that only demonstrably misleading messages are enjoined. In
essence, the issue is: how demonstrably deceptive must a trade practice be before
an injunction is appropriate, or, alternatively phrased so as to disclose the statis-
tical and procedural issues, what kind of demonstration will suffice to justify an
injunction and what process will best ensure that the statistics themselves are not
misleading?
Sections II and III of this article consider a variety of guidelines that have been
used or recommended to direct scientific and econometric research in several sub-
stantive law areas. Characteristics peculiar to the factual issues in deceptive adver-
tising cases are highlighted and compared to issues arising in those areas. An
examination of the distinction between and relevance of "practical significance"
and "statistical significance" in Section IV leads to the identification in Section V
of principles which would clarify and simplify both litigation and remedies in
deceptive advertising.
II
FDA PRINCIPLES PROVIDE A MODEL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
EVALUATION OF CLINICAL STUDIES
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has adopted a set of principles that
provide the basis for determining whether there is "substantial evidence" to sup-
port effectiveness claims for drugs. I7 These principles anticipate that there will be
adjudicatory consideration of expert testimony based upon clinical investigations
which demonstrate that the drug will have the effect it is represented to have.' 8
The principles are based on standards recognized by the scientific community as
essential to an adequate and well-controlled clinical study. 19 While the FTC has
rejected this "adequate and well-controlled" standard in favor of a " 'reasonable
basis' for making performance claims" standard 20 the FDA guidelines do indicate
what constitutes sound quantitative evidence. These indicia may be applicable to
a number of cases over which the FTC exercises its deceptive advertising
jurisdiction.
The FDA principles require that a reported effectiveness study include, inter
ah'a:
16. Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 620 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
17. 21 C.F.R. § 314.111(a)(5)(ii)(a)-(c) (1983).
18. 21 C.F.R. § 314.111(a)(5)(i) (1983).
19. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 62 (1972).
20. Id.
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1. "A clear statement of the objectives of the study."
2. A method of selecting subjects for the study that assures suitability.
3. Unbiased treatment of subjects in their assignment to test and control groups.
4. Explanation of the "methods of observation and recording of results" and of
the "steps taken to minimize bias on the part of the subject and observer."
5. A presentation of results in a manner that is amenable to quantitative analysis.
6. A summary of analytical methods including statistical methods and an evalua-
tion of the data derived from the study.
2 1
FDA procedural rules clearly indicate that any of these criteria may be waived by
the Director of the Bureau of Drugs if a person who would be adversely affected by
application of the principles petitions for such relief, demonstrates the nonapplica-
bility of the principles, and indicates substitute alternative methods which will
ensure the scientific integrity of the study. 22 However, studies for which there is no
control group or only a partial control group are not acceptable as the sole support
for a performance claim, although they may serve as corroboration, and "[i]solated
case reports, random experience, and reports lacking the details which permit sci-
entific evaluation" are not to be considered at all. 23
These principles are designed to provide enough background and evaluation
material so that someone other than the researcher can (1) appreciate the nature
and procedure of the study, (2) replicate it if that is desired, and (3) reanalyze the
data. The first and third requirements are of particular importance to a finder-of-
fact who must appreciate the purposes of and assumptions underlying a study in
order to determine the relevance of the scientific inquiry to the legal issue at hand.
The fact finder then must be able to reanalyze the data in order to fit the scientific
conclusions into an appropriate legal context or procedural posture. The replica-
tion requirement serves as a guarantee of the investigator's experimental and eval-
uative abilities as well as his honesty since it provides for verification of the results.
The need to put scientific conclusions into a legal procedural framework and
the difference between scientifically significant results and legally significant
results are illustrated by Certified Color Manufacturers Association v. Mathews, 24 a case
in which finders-of-fact evaluated the safety of the food additive, Red Dye No. 2.
Although this case arose under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, -' it
might easily have been a deceptive advertising claim before the FTC.
In Certified Color, Dr. Gaylor reported on a biostatistical study conducted specif-
ically for the Toxicological Advisory Committee established by the Commissioner
of Food and Drugs to make recommendations on the safety of Red Dye No. 2. He
had found a statistically significant positive relationship between the dietary
dosage of Red Dye No. 2 and the frequency of cancer in test rats. An ad hoc
"Working Group," convened to review the study and apply the scientific evidence
21. 21 C.F.R. § 314.111(a)(5)(ii)(a)(1)-(5) (1983).
22. 21 C.F.R. § 314.111(a) (1983).
23. 21 C.F.R. § 314.111(a)(5)(ii)(c) (1983).
24. 543 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
25. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, 21 U.S.C. § 376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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to the legal context in which the issue arose, came to six conclusions which present
a picture of confusion as to the scientific implications of the study.
Two pieces of evidence supported a finding that Red Dye No. 2 was a
carcinogen:
1. Female rats in the high dosage groups suffered a "statistically significant
increase in malignant tumors" compared to those in the control group, and
2. There was a "possible" relationship between increased dose and increased like-
lihood of malignant tumors for females in all four dosage groups. 26
Evidence not supporting carcinogenicity included four findings:
1. There was "no statistically significant increase in malignant tumors" demon-
strated in male rats,
2. If one aggregated all types of tumors, there was no significant relationship
between dose and likelihood of cancer,
3. No rats had any "unusual or unique" tumors, and
4. No single tumor type showed an increase over that observed in the control
group.2 7
While this study led to scientific uncertainty as to the carcinogenic properties
of Red Dye No. 2, it led to no legal ambiguities. This illustrates the important
translation from scientific to legal significance. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act 28 required that an additive be deemed unsafe unless the Commissioner,
exercising his scientific judgment in determining whether safety had been proven,
had issued a regulation indicating that the additive had been found suitable for
general use or for particular specified uses. 29 At the effective date of the Act many
additives would have been "deemed unsafe" 30 automatically because investiga-
tions into their safety would not yet have occurred. Accordingly, some additives
were given "provisional listings" 3' pending completion of appropriate scientific
tests. For Red Dye No. 2, the scientific uncertainty resulting from Dr. Gaylor's
study meant that the ongoing tests would not be able to prove that the additive
was safe. Even though the study did not conclusively establish that the additive
was unsafe, the completion of the study eliminated any justification for either the
provisional listing or for postponing the removal of Red Dye No. 2 from the
approved list. According to the court, " 'Cessat ratione, cessat' postponement. '32
While popular reports at the time of this termination of listing suggested that the
additive caused cancer, the legal significance of the study was that there was no
immediate prospect of proving the additive to be safe. The legal significance
26. 543 F.2d at 291 n.35. The first of these findings compares cancer rates between those female rats
receiving dietary concentrations of 3% Red Dye No. 2 to those receiving 0% Red Dye No. 2. The second
finding considers the effect among four groups of rats, each of which was assigned a different dietary
concentration of 0%, 0.003%, 0.3%, or 3% Red Dye No. 2. Id at 290. The second finding thus allows the
researcher to examine the effect of small increases in exposure to the carcinogen while the first allows a
comparison between two groups.
27. Id at 291 n.25.
28. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
29. COrtifid Color Mfrs. Ass'n, 543 F.2d at 287.
30. Id
31. Id at 286-87.
32. Id at 292.
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derives from an appreciation of the scientific method behind the study which
enables one to interpret the results and their scientific significance.
Appreciation of a clinical investigator's method and assumptions is critical not
only in nonadjudicatory proceedings, such as Certified Color, but also in adjudica-
tory hearings such as those conducted by the FTC in deceptive advertising cases.
In ITT Continental Baking Co., 33 the Wonder Bread case, the FTC ordered a manufac-
turer, seller, and distributor of bakery products to cease misrepresenting the nutri-
tional content of its bread.34 Dr. Peter Rossi was one of the experts called by the
manufacturer to testify on consumers' perceptions, derived from television adver-
tisements, of Wonder Bread's nutritional qualities.
On direct examination, Dr. Rossi estimated that between 10% and 25% of the
housewife population regarded Wonder Bread as nutritionally superior to other
breads. 35 Giving a range within which an expert expects an estimate to fall is a
common method for statisticians to reveal their uncertainty regarding a particular
conclusion.
The study on which this conclusion was based was actually two different
studies concerning two different subjects. An analysis of the study on cross-exami-
nation revealed that Dr. Rossi's estimate was only an educated guess. When com-
bined with additional data from a third study, the witness broadened the range of
this estimate to include zero, indicating that he could not predict with much cer-
tainty the proportion of the housewife population that regarded Wonder Bread as
nutritionally superior. 36
Such a line of cross-examination would not have been possible without an
appreciation of the nature and procedure of the studies and sufficient disclosure by
the party offering the evidence of the resulting data and statistical methodology
used in analysis. While diligent and wearisome cross-examination might reveal
this information, pretrial disclosure of information comparable to that specified in
the FDA regulations might streamline the process.
3 7
The Wonder Bread survey is similar to the clinical investigations described in the
FDA rules in that it required the use of control groups. The effect of exposure to
television advertisements on viewers' perceptions, like the effect of exposure to Red
Dye No. 2 on bodily tissue, could be quantitatively compared for those who had
been exposed and those who had not.
In some cases, the failure to retain the purity of the control group has resulted
33. 83 F.T.C. 865 (1973), modified, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976), order superseded, 90 F.T.C. 181 (1977).
34. Id at 973-74.
35. Id. at 907.
36. Id
37. The need for streamlining litigation in cases involving quantitative evidence is specifically recog-
nized in the Data Committee Recommendations, supra note 6, as being in the spirit of the general recom-
mendation made in the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (5th ed. 1982) that as many issues as possible
relating to data and its analysis be resolved prior to trial. This need is also recognized generally in local
rules encouraging settlement and in FED. R. Cir. P. 16 (Pre-trial Procedure; Formulating Issues), which
give courts discretion to direct attorneys for the parties to confer in order to simplify issues and obtain
admissions of fact and documents which will avoid unnecessary proof. The desirability of expanded pre-
trial discovery and some suggested rules are discussed later in this article.
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in complete rejection of the study. In Wamer-Lambert Co., : 8 the famous Lister'ne
case, potential observer awareness of which group was the control and which was
actually gargling with Listerine led to a rejection of the results. 39 This problem is
referred to as a lack of "blindness" in a study.
The study was designed to examine the effectiveness of gargling with Listerine
in preventing colds. School students gargled with either a colored water rinse or
Listerine and were examined by a doctor when they contracted colds. Because the
doctor could smell Listerine on the breath of any complaining student, the test was
biased. Because the students could tell from the flavor whether they were gargling
with Listerine or water, and because they might have been exposed to Listerine
advertisements on television, this clinical investigation was not "accurate and well-
controlled."
In evaluating the utility of the test, the Commission found that the test lacked
probative value to "show that the use of Listerine is efficacious for colds and cold
symptoms. '40 Under the FDA principles, this poorly controlled experiment might
be useful only for purposes of corroboration. The FTC found that "the over-
whelming weight of probative evidence" compelled a conclusion that Listerine was
not efficacious in preventing colds. 4 1
Although evidence from clinical studies is utilized in disputes under both the
FDA and the FTC, the FDA principles cannot be translated wholesale into the
FTC context. The legal issue towards which the FDA principles are directed is
whether the manufacturer has "substantial evidence" in the form of an "accurate
and well-controlled" clinical investigation. 42 The FTC, in advertising cases, must
decide whether the advertisements have a "tendency and capacity to mislead. '"i
Thus two additional considerations are involved in FTC determinations. One
consideration is that the Commission must balance contradictory results from
competing clinical investigations in evaluating the accuracy of product claims,
rather than determine whether a manufacturer has one "adequate and well-con-
trolled" study behind him to prove efficacy. 4 4 The second consideration is that
even literal truthfulness of the claim will not protect the advertiser if the resulting
advertisement is deceptive. 45
Moreover, not all quantitative propositions evaluated by the FTC in deceptive
advertising cases can be characterized as testable by structured, controllable
clinical investigations. Cases involving surveys, for instance, often involve the
questioning of individuals who do have a specialized knowledge about the product
manufactured or sold by defenders of advertising practices. This procedure can be
contrasted to the questioning of a control group which is unfamiliar with the
38. Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398 (1975), modfied, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cer. dented,
435 U.S. 950 (1978).
39. Id at 1431-32.
40. Id at 1428.
41. Id at 1496-97.
42. 21 C.F.R. § 314.1 ll(a)(5)(ii)(a)-(c) (1983).
43. See Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. at 1461.
44. Id This distinction is drawn by the Commission.
45. See, e.g., P. Lorillard Co. v. PFC, 186 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1950) (advertisement claim of"lowest tar
and nicotine" among tested brands true but deceptive because actual difference in levels was negligible).
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product that is the subject of the inquiry. This is true both of cases investigating
the legitimacy of an advertised survey, the results of which are allegedly deceptive,
and of cases where a survey is offered as part of the evidence that an advertisement
is deceptive.
In Litton Industries, Inc. 46 which illustrates the first type of survey use, the manu-
facturer advertised that "76% of the independent microwave oven service techni-
cians surveyed recommend Litton. '4 7 The survey respondents were 234
technicians who worked for independent service agencies authorized to service
Litton microwave ovens and who serviced at least one other microwave brand.48
The FTC charged that the survey, even though conducted by an independent
testing agency, 49 did not support this and related advertising claims.
The basic error was that the testing agency surveyed technicians who worked
at Litton-authorized service agencies appearing on a list provided by Litton. The
list was intended to include service technicians who were free of the biasing influ-
ence of a relationship to a manufacturer or a dealer. However, some of the dealers
were included on this list of authorized service agents on their insistence as a pre-
condition for their carrying Litton ovens. Litton knew, or should have known, -50
that the lists were tainted by the inclusion of servicing dealers who, because they
combined a sales and service function, might have a bias towards a particular
oven.
It was concluded that because the survey was potentially biased in Litton's
favor, the survey did not provide a reasonable basis for Litton's advertising claim.
The problem in Litlon was not an improper control group, although the Commis-
sion was presented with a quantitative comparison of the reactions of different
human "subjects." The problem was one of partiality, more generally defined as
nonrandomness, which is typically associated with surveys.
The problem of randomness also appears in Kroger Co. 1 Although the case is
considered by some to "set an unrealistic standard of methodological purity for
advertisers using surveys," 52 it provides an instructive example of a survey of non-
human subjects.
Kroger, a retail food chain, advertised survey-based food price comparisons,
known as the "Kroger Price Patrol," to support advertised statements such as
"The Price Patrol Proves You Save More at Kroger" and "Shopping at Kroger
will enable you to spend less for your food than at any other store." 5 The survey
compared prices for 150 food items at Kroger and other retail food markets.
Kroger advertised the results by relating how many items had higher prices at
Kroger and how many items had higher prices at competitive stores. Not surpris-
ingly, the results favored Kroger.
46. 97 F.T.C. 1 (1981).
47. Id at 15.
48. Id at 16.
49. Id at 22-23.
50. Id at 26-28.
51. 98 F.T.C. 639 (1981), modeed. 100 FT.C. 573 (1982).
52. 44 ANTITRU'ST & TRADE REG. REi. (BNA) No, 1097, at 56 (Jan. 13. 1983).
53. 98 F.T.C. at 641.
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Two sources of nonrandomness entered into the survey process. The first was
that the store employees knew, when changing prices, which items were included
on the Price Patrol Survey. This knowledge enabled Kroger employees to prevent
price increases and even to institute decreases on items on the survey. The propo-
nent of the survey was effectively in control of the outcome. In addition, some
significant categories of food items such as meat, produce, and certain dairy items
were omitted from the Price Patrol survey. This meant that the survey did not
sample a random selection of grocery items. This selection of categories combined
with control over prices of the survey items theoretically allowed Kroger to have
higher prices while its survey showed its lower prices.
The initial order of the FTC 54 required that Kroger refrain from advertising
survey results or claims based on any surveys unless:
A. The survey is "designed and conducted" using methodologically sound
procedures;
B. "Any results . . .which are advertised . . .[are] presented in a manner that
fairly and impartially represents those conclusions . . 4"
C. "The results, data and complete description of the method .. are. . . avail-
able to the public for inspection and copying . . .;"
D. The advertisement "clearly and conspicuously" discloses that the survey does
not include any significant category of food unless that category is fairly and ade-
quately represented in the survey.55 The emphasis is not only on prevention of
deception in advertising, but also on public disclosure of both the results and the
underlying methodology, reminiscent of the FDA requirement of disclosure of
methodology necessary for outsider review and reanalysis.
In Californa Milk Producers Advzsoy Board, '6 the Commission considered the
results of a survey which demonstrated the viewing audience's interpretation of the
advertisement, as in the Wonder Bread studies discussed above. Unlike the
Wonder Bread study, which compared the product impressions of a group exposed
to the advertisements with those of a group not exposed to the advertisements,
there was no need for a control group in Califormia Milk. The issue was not the
effect of the advertisement on viewers' perception of the product but, rather, the
viewers' perceptions of the message the commercials were attempting to convey.
To find a group of people with the requisite special knowledge, the surveying
advertising agency for the organization of milk producers telephoned over 9000
phone numbers to find 465 persons who had watched television advertisements
conveying the message, "Every body needs milk."' 57 This process explicitly elimi-
nated from consideration those subjects who would fit into a "control" group.
When considering survey evidence, the FTC may or may not benefit from the
FDA guidelines for clinical studies, depending on whether or not the survey
requires a control group. This is true both for surveys which are deceptively
advertised and for surveys used to prove or disprove deception. The use of surveys
54. Id at 717-21.
55. Id at 718-20; see also id. at 773-74.
56. 94 F.T.C. 429 (1979).
57. Id at 460.
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gives rise to additional problems, such as a randomness, which implicitly affect
clinical investigations but are not explicitly addressed in the FDA principles.
Those principles do suggest, however, considerations relevant to a set of FTC
guidelines.
III
FINKELSTEIN PROTOCOLS PROVIDE MODEL FOR EVALUATION OF
ECONOMETRIC STUDIES
A. Protocols for the Use of Regression Models in Administrative Hearings
The protocols described by Michael Finkelstein 58 for application by adminis-
trative agencies lend themselves more directly to social science research than to the
type of clinical investigation contemplated by the FDA principles. However,
because the quantitative evidence considered by the FTC lies somewhere between
those two models, a consideration of the protocols will be instructive. To systema-
tize and simplify the use of statistical models:
1. [An administrative] decision maker should [(a)] specify the data of such relevance and
importance that he finds merits econometric analysis, and [(b)] require that econometric
presentations begin with those data and incorporate other data on a separate basis only
when necessary for the purpose of accuracy or refinement.
5 9
2. [A] party objecting to an econometric model introduced by another party should
demonstrate the numerical significance of his objections whenever possible, and [(b)] a
party objecting to a model . . . designated by the decision maker for econometric analysis
should produce a superior alternative analysis of those data.
60
3. [I]n any case in which the decision maker resorts to significant use of econometric
findings, he should select the model that most usefully describes the data and . . . base his
findings on that model.
6 1
4. [A] finding resting in substantial part on data which have been analyzed econometri-
cally should be no more precise than the finding which the decision maker is prepared to
accept on the basis of econometric analysis.
6 2
A critical distinction between the FDA principles and these protocols is that
the clinical investigations contemplated by the FDA are a method by which data
are derived, whereas the protocols guide the analysis of quantitative evidence and
subsequent litigation and decisionmaking.
Finkelstein finds support for his protocols in cases evaluating data describing
the cost of equity capital for various regulated utility groups and the variability of
their earnings,63 historical cash prices for wheat, 64 historical prices for natural
gas,65 cost and transaction data for brokerage firms,66 and airline fares and air
58. M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 6, at 232-47.
59. Id. at 232-33. It is contemplated that the decisionmaker will receive submissions from the parties
on the appropriate data base and then designate the data he deems appropriate.
60. Id at 238.
61. Id. at 244.
62. Id at 247.
63. Western Union Tel. Co., 34 F.C.C.2d 914 (1972), 51 F.C.C.2d 205 (1975), cited in M. FINKEL-
STEIN, supra note 6, at 215.
64. Cargill, Inc., No. 120 (C.E.A. Aug. 13, 1970),aftfd, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 932 (1972), cited in M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 6, at 224.
65. Permian Basin Area Rate Proceeding, 34 F.P.C. 159 (1965), afd, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), cited in M.
FINKELSTEIN, supra note 6, at 227-29; Southern Louisiana Area Rate Proceeding, 40 F.P.C. 530 (1968),
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traffic. 67 In each of these cases, it was unnecessary for the appropriate agency to
conduct an experiment, perform tests on individual subjects, or establish control
groups. The data were already available for analysis.
However, collection of the data may present enormous problems. Recorded
data are often scattered over many locations, although still available at some cost.
In addition, analysis of the data is by no means simple. This type of case does
require decisions as to which data to evaluate, for example, what variables are
relevant, which measurements are appropriate, and which analytical model is
most descriptive of the phenomenon being studied.
The litigation of claims based on clinical studies and claims based on
econometric studies that analyze different data have a common element. Whether
comparing scientific studies that have conflicting results or comparing econometric
results that have different data bases, the decisionmaker is required to investigate
several models of research in order to select the one that is most appropriate. This
similarity ignores the differences in how the data is gathered and in the analytical
process between reports of clinical investigations and alternative econometric
models. Different clinical investigations require independently generated experi-
mental data while alternative, conflicting econometric models may share the same
raw numerical input.
Employment discrimination cases, which seem to capture the attention and
interest of many scholars and practitioners interested in the use of quantitative
evidence in litigation, are of the nonclinical type. It is not surprising that a dif-
ferent set of principles should direct the development and presentation of statis-
tical evidence in these cases.
The Title VII case of Presseisen v. Swarthmore College68 provides an example of
these econometric arguments. In Presseisen, a terminated assistant professor in the
Education Program at Swarthmore alleged unlawful employment discrimination
on the basis of sex in violation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972 .69
To support the claim that Swarthmore discriminated in setting salaries, the
plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. deCani, testified that sex appeared to be a statisti-
cally significant factor in setting salaries.70 His testimony was based on a multiple
regression analysis that he had performed on salaries for full-time faculty at
Swarthmore using as independent variables sex, age, years since highest degree,
years at Swarthmore, degree, and academic division.
The defendant's expert witness, Dr. Iverson, employed the same data base
drawn from employment records at Swarthmore but used slightly different vari-
modifid, 41 F.P.C. 301 (1969), afd, 428 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.), cert. dented, 400 U.S. 950 (1970), cited in M.
FINKELSTEIN, supra note 6, at 227-29.
66. SEC Rate Structure Investigation of National Securities Exchanges, No. 4-144 (S.E.C. filed May
28, 1968), cited in M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 6, at 235.
67. Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation Phase 7, No. 21866-7 (C.A.B. Apr. 9, 1971), 57 C.A.B. 188
(1971), 63 C.A.B. 291 (1973), cited in M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 6, at 240.
68. 442 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1977), afd, 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1978).
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
70. Rresseisen, 442 F. Supp. at 614-15.
Page 25: Autumn 1983]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
ables in his regression model-rank, division, sex, years in a given rank, and
degree. Dr. Iverson testified that the sex variable did not yield a statistically signif-
icant disparity. 7'
The purpose of these regression analyses was to separate and quantify the influ-
ences of the independent variables on salary. There is no suggestion that any com-
putational error resulted in one expert finding that sex played a significant role in
salary determination while the other found that it did not. The difference is in the
model, that is, in the initial decision as to what variables affect the salary determi-
nation. Much was made in this case of the decision whether or not to include the
variable "rank." While the court resolved this issue in favor of Dr. Iverson and the
defendant, it essentially took an agnostic stance with respect to the models, sug-
gesting the possibility "that the salary issue is inherently incapable of being ana-
lyzed through statistics," 72 and found no proof of discrimination. In contrast, FTC
reviews of clinical studies are more likely to direct criticism against the method by
which the data was derived than against how it was analyzed. 73
Reports of similar econometric feuds in FTC cases filter down from expert wit-
nesses hired to do battle. Dr. Peter Rossi relates a tale of three days on the witness
stand defending his econometric models against the lawyers for American Home
Products who sought to protect the image of Anacin in a deceptive advertising
case. 74 The chief lawyer for Anacin had taken an advanced course in multivariate
analysis in preparation for the battle and was flanked by platoons of
econometricians who "sent a steady flow of yellow slips of paper toward him" with
questions to harass the enemy. 75 Thus, cases before the FTC are likely to involve
the fights over econometric modeling that characterize discrimination cases as well
as an analytical similarity in litigation strategy.
B. Coordinating Data Analysis Between Opposing Parties
FTC cases generally involve clinical or survey evidence that has either been
offered by the party whose commercial practice is challenged or been prepared by
an expert for the Commission. Just as the evaluation of clinical studies benefits
from incorporation of FDA principles, litigation involving data prepared for the
purpose of a Commission hearing may benefit from protocols to be applied to
business data and surveys made for the purpose of litigation. The similarities
between administrative agency hearings and FTC decisionmaking suggest that it
would be appropriate to take a closer look at the New York City Bar's Data Com-
mittee Recommendations, 76 which are patterned after the Finkelstein protocols,
for managing cases with substantial quantities of data.
Three relevant principles may be taken from these recommendations: (1) the
71. Id. at 616.
72. Id at 619.
73. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398 (1975),modified, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978).
74. M. SAKS & C. BARON, THE USE, NONUSE, AND MISUSE OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE
COURTS 98 (1980).
75. Id. at 100.
76. See Data Committee Recommendations, supra note 6.
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principle of cooperation, (2) the principle of pretrial settlement of issues, and (3)
the principle of simplification. The recommendations incorporate the principle of
cooperation by suggesting that, before trial, each party make available to the other
parties machine-readable and hard copy documentation of the data used in its
analysis, a list of its data evaluation personnel, and a report on its expert's data
base, methods of analysis, assumptions, and conclusions. 77 This recommendation
to exchange data is more relevant to surveys developed for FTC hearings than to
clinical studies which address the same ultimate issues of safety or efficacy using
different data bases. Such cooperation not only limits the need for extended dis-
covery while the expert is testifying on the stand during trial, but also furthers the
principle of pretrial settlement by promoting a common understanding of each
party's stance with respect to the merits of the case and by encouraging settlement
of evidentiary issues peripheral to the ultimate legal or factual issues to be decided
at trial.
Pretrial settlement is also encouraged by a recommendation that all objections
to data or methods of analysis be raised prior to trial.78 A major difficulty with the
evaluation of statistical evidence by a finder-of-fact, whether or not empirically
oriented and statistically sophisticated, is that it is too late once an expert is on the
stand for the expert to respond to challenges by hostile lawyers asking him to
quantify the implications of objections raised by the opposing expert.
In the Presseisen case discussed above,7 9 an expert for the defendant criticized
plaintiff's expert Dr. deCani's regression analysis for failing to measure the effect
on salary of a teacher's ranking among the junior, as opposed to the senior, faculty.
Since the challenge was not disclosed until the plaintiff was at trial, it was too late
for Dr. deCani to incorporate the potentially negligible effect of this criticism into
his model. As a result of this and similar unanswerable criticisms, his modeling
was in vain. The principle of simplification would have been furthered had objec-
tions been made before the trial began. Justice would also be better served by an
exchange of data prior to trial than by unexpected cross-examination of the
experts on the stand.
In the administrative context there is greater opportunity for parties to coordi-
nate modeling activity than in the judicial context. In a case before the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC),8o a state utilities commission challenged
the choice of independent variables used by an expert relied upon by the FERC.
The expert was given time to recalculate the critical coefficients; he estimated the
difference between the original and modified findings to be only 3%, which the
court found on review to be an insignificant difference. 8 1 Guidelines for FTC
practice should recognize such opportunities for cooperative analysis.
The principle of simplification would also be served by the Committee's recom-
77. See id. Recommendations 1, 2, 5, 6, at 6-11, 19-21.
78. Id Recommendation 8, at 22.
79. Presseisen v. Swathmore College, 442 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aJ'd, 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir.
1978).
80. South Dakota Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 643 F.2d 504, rev'd, 668
F.2d 333 (8th Cir. 1981).
81. Id at 512.
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mendation that the effects of asserted defects in an opposing party's study be quan-
tified whenever possible by the objecting party.8 2 Shifting the burden of
quantification eliminates the need for a party to examine and quantify all objec-
tions raised by an opposing party. This procedure would simplify trial prepara-
tion, and help prevent valuable, informative evidence from being disparaged and
ignored simply because the expert cannot recompute while on the stand. It would
also simplify the task facing the finder-of-fact by providing an indication of the
weightiness of an objection or the importance of a certain line of cross-
examination.
A set of guidelines for the FTC and practitioners to follow in deceptive adver-
tising cases might beneficially be drawn from an amalgamation of principles in the
FDA regulations, Finkelstein's protocols for administrative decisionmakers, and
the Data Committee Recommendations. The guidelines must ensure: (1) method-
ological soundness in choosing the data base to be analyzed whether it is a clinical
test, a survey, or a sampling; (2) cooperation among parties in preparation for
formal adjudicatory hearings in order to ensure the fullest possible examination of
the relevant data; and (3) a constructive format for presenting evidence to the fact
finder. In each of the three stages implicit in the guidelines, that is, data gathering
and modeling, pretrial preparation and discovery, and litigation, the underlying
organizational goal is to ensure that the evidence developed has the greatest pos-
sible practical, as well as statistical, significance.
IV
PRACTICAL AND STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
The evidence in the Warner-Lambert case that failed to establish the efficacy of
Listerine in preventing colds was found to be lacking in probative value because
the test was methodologically unsound, due to lack of blindness and lack of effec-
tive control, and because the results showed only negligible differences between
gargling with Listerine and water.8 3 If a test is methodologically unsound, then
the quantitative estimates produced, even if great in magnitude, are not relevant
as evidence. Given this insubstantial foundation, the estimates do nothing to
establish the truth or falsity of a factual assertion. Similarly, if a test is method-
ologically unsound, statistical tests designed to estimate the probability that a
quantitative estimate could have occurred by chance are not useful because theo-
retical assumptions underlying those tests, such as randomness of a sample, are
violated. Methodological soundness is an obvious predicate for the relevance of
quantitative evidence, but it alone is not enough to ensure relevance.
Principles for determining which relevant quantitative evidence is noteworthy,
or makes a material difference, and which relevant quantitative evidence is not
due to chance, or is credible, are a necessary part of the guidelines to be designed
to facilitate litigation. Practical and statistical significance are both terms of art.
82. Data Committee Recommendations, supra note 6, at 20-21.
83. Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1432 (1975), modif d, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978).
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A measurement that is very unlikely to have occurred by chance is of great statis-
tical significance. A measurement which is of great magnitude or is otherwise note-
worthy is of great practical sinicance, as long as it is relevant to the legal or factual
issues involved in a particular case. To be persuasive as evidence, quantitative
conclusions based on methodologically sound studies must be both practically and
statistically significant.
Standards for statistical significance accepted by social scientists,8 4 physical
scientists, 8 5 the Federal Trade Commission,8 6 and the Supreme Court, 87 are confi-
dence levels of 95% or 99%, or equivalently, 5% or 1% significance levels, respec-
tively. In Bristol-Myers, 88 statistical techniques were used to evaluate the results of
clinical investigations of the analgesic effect of various pain relievers. When the
results of such studies purport to describe the differences between fungible drug
products, it is important to know whether the asserted differences are due to
chance, due to some random fluctuation, or due to an actual difference between
the drugs.
A discussion of statistical significance includes the probability that differences
calculated from the results of an adequate and well-controlled study could be due
to chance. The significance level presents the probability between 0, representing
a zero probability that the difference is due to chance, and 1.00, representing a
100% chance that the difference is due to random fluctuation in the observations
made. Accordingly, the lower the significance, that is, the closer to zero, the
greater the statistical significance. It is commonly accepted that a significance
level of 0.05, meaning that there is at most one chance in twenty that the differ-
ence is not real but is just due to chance, is a small enough probability of error that
scientists can conclude that the differences are real. Naturally, an even lower sig-
nificance level, such a 0.001, would make a fact finder even more confident that
there was a real difference. Evidence of a real difference resulting from a method-
ologically sound study is credible to a fact finder as long as the methodology and
design of the study are clear and assumptions underlying the investigation are
understood.
To be credible, the quantitative evidence must be statistically significant.
Accordingly, much of the debate over statistical proof is over the statistical signifi-
cance of the results. In the L'slertne case,8 9 for instance, a test with over 3000
subjects at St. Barnabas Catholic School showed that there were statistically signif-
icant differences between the average severity on a 0 to 6 scale of colds and cold
symptoms for students who gargled with Listerine and the control group who gar-
84. See, e.g., T. WONNACOTT & R. WONNACOTT, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS 173 (1969).
85. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Co., No. 8917, slip op. at Findings 390-94, 425-28 (F.T.C. Sept. 28, 1979)
(available on LEXIS, FTC library).
86. See, e.g., K Mart Enters., Inc., 84 F.T.C. 574, 575 (1974); Bristol-Myers Co., No. 8917, slip op. at
390-94, 425-28.
87. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.1 7 (1977) (applied two or three standard deviations
rule equivalent to 95% to 99% confidence level).
88. Bristol-Myers Co., No. 8917 (F.T.C. Sept. 28, 1979) (available on LEXIS, FTC library).
89. Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398 (1975), modfwd, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 950 (1978); see supra text accompanying notes 33-37.
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gled with water. That data appeared as follows: 90
Listerine Control
Group Group
Overall Severity 2.191 2.305
Symptom Severity
Nasal Discharge 2.341 2.457
Nasal Congestion 2.657 2.787
Postnasal Drip 2.015 2.178
Sneezing 1.811 1.946
Sore Throat 1.321 1.466
Cough 1.920 2.112
Recorded and averaged over the four years of the study, these results were found
by the clinical investigators to show statistically significant differences and thus to
demonstrate that, for instance, the lower severity of coughing by those using Lis-
terine, 1.920 compared to 2.112, was not due to chance or some random fluctua-
tion in the measurement.
The Commission notes, however, that "the existence of a slalts/l'ca4ly significant
difference does not mean that the difference is medcaly significant or meaningful.
There is a difference between statistical significance and medical significance." 91
The Commission is both right and wrong; it is correct in that one must consider
the size of the difference to see whether it is of therapeutic importance. The statis-
tical significance "does not indicate the size of the difference or how much benefit
is to be expected because of the difference. If a large enough sample is used a very,
very small difference can be found to be statistically significant. '92
The Commission is incorrect in suggesting that a finding of statistical signifi-
cance is not conceptually meaningful. The purpose of quantifying the results of a
well-controlled clinical test is to examine alternative explanations for the differ-
ence, as in this case, between prevention of colds by gargling with water or with
Listerine. The first explanation for the results which established a statistically sig-
nificant difference is that Listerine performs as claimed by the manufacturer; the
second explanation is that chance caused the disparity to occur. A statement that
the difference is statistically significant represents a finding that chance is rela-
tively unlikely (less than 5% probability) to have caused the difference. Given that
the study was well-designed and executed so that alternative theories of causation
are eliminated, the efficacy of Listerine is the only remaining causal factor.
The Commission's observation that increasing the sample size increases the
probability of finding statistical significance does not disparage the study, but is
merely an accurate comment on statistical methodology. Increasing sample size
enables one to estimate the magnitude of any difference with greater precision.
Even a small difference may be statistically significant in a large sample. A finding
of statistical significance is meaningful in that it eliminates chance as a causal
90. Id. at 1432.
91. Id at 1432-33.
92. Id at 1432.
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explanation, even though it gives no indication of the absolute magnitude of the
demonstrated difference and, therefore, of its medical significance.
The first medical, rather than statistical, criticism of the results is that the dif-
ferences are too small to convince the Commission that the difference has medical
significance, or, as the concept is broadly denominated, practical significance.
Remember that the cold victims were ranking severity of cold and cold symptoms
on a scale of 1 to 6 with 6 representing greater severity. The reported results indi-
cated that the difference between Listerine and the control group for coughing was
only 0.192. The Commission, in discussing the medical significance of this result,
correctly pointed out that one could not differentiate between a person suffering
from a 1.920 degree cold and a 2.112 degree cold. 93 It is safe to venture that a cold
sufferer neither could nor would feel a 0.192 degree change in his or her condition.
Similar conclusions were reached in Stauffer Laboratories, Inc., 94 the Magic Couch
case. The seller of a motorized vibrating platform was ordered to cease advertising
that the device helped to slim the body in particular areas such as hips, thighs,
legs, and stomach, as well as to reduce overall body weight.
The manufacturer brought in a witness who claimed to have lost 130 pounds
without changing her eating habits. 95 In evidence presented to rebut the com-
plaint, an expert measured the chiange in energy consumption as a result of using
the machine; the difference appeared to be practically significant. Dr. Ellestad,
the expert witness, reported a 10.5% increase in a body's energy usage while the
machine was vibrating compared to when the machine was turned off.
Because this energy use translates into a 10.5 percent increase in calorie con-
sumption, it would seem to make a significant difference in weight reduction.96
The results, however, were not statistically significant; the increase in energy con-
sumption could have been due to random fluctuation in the variables observed. In
this example, chance was not eliminated as a causal factor to explain why weight
loss occurred. If the fact finder is not willing to believe the truthfulness of the
asserted difference because there is too large a probability of error, then the evi-
dence is not credible.
Evidence of statistical significance is found in cases other than those involving
tests of medications, as in Listerine, or products, as in the Magic Couch case. For
example, the cases using surveys are equally replete with findings of the presence
or absence of statistically significant evidence.
In .4acMillan, Inc. 97 the Resource Planning Commission (RPC) was hired by
the FTC to evaluate experiences of students who had been enrolled in courses run
by LaSalle Extension University, a wholly-owned subsidiary of MacMillan, which
93. Id at 1433.
94. 64 F.T.C. 629 (1964), af'd, 343 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1965).
95. Id. at 640.
96. In the opinion of the Commission's expert, the results were not practically significant in addition
to being not statistically significant. The increase in energy consumption translated into a burning of 8.5
calories per hour or 1/25th of an ounce of body weight. This amount of weight loss could also be achieved
in six to eight minutes of sitting and talking. If the action of the vibrating couch alone were to be relied on
for weight reduction, "it would take 400 days to lose one pound of weight." Id at 642.
97. 96 F.T.C. 208 (1980).
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had been charged with misrepresenting job and earning potential for its graduates.
To ensure that its survey of recent graduates was random and, therefore, unbiased,
RPC compared characteristics of those who did respond to the survey to character-
istics of those who did not. The opinion does not report the magnitude of any
difference between these groups, but does indicate that "no statistically significant
differences were found," leading to the conclusion that the respondents had not
created a bias in the form of self-selection. 98 Since there was a greater than 5%
probability that the difference occurred by chance, any assertion of a difference
between respondents and nonrespondents was not credible and, consequently, the
magnitude of any calculated differences did not matter.
The Brzstol-Myers and Listert'ne cases suggest that quantitative evidence which is
statistically significant but not practically significant will be unpersuasive. As
illustrated in Magic Couch and MacMillan, any evidence that is not statistically sig-
nificant will be unpersuasive, even if it is great in magnitude and would be of
considerable practical significance were it not possible that the results were due to
chance. As may be expected, evidence that is both statistically and practically
significant will be credible and will carry considerable weight, while evidence that
is neither statistically nor practically significant will not be worthy of belief and
will carry no weight.
Material evidence is evidence that "makes a difference." Legal significance
and "materiality" must be clearly distinguished from practical significance. In
discussing the practical significance of results obtained from clinical studies, Dr.
Beaver in Brstol-Mers said:
[T]he difference, to be a difference, must make a difference. What we would normally do
is say if the difference is small beyond a certain point, it may, in fact, exist but it doesn't
make any difference. It does not serve as a reasonable basis for choosing one product over
another [or] making a particular claim about a product. 9 9
From the FTC's perspective, a clinical finding that a difference is of no prac-
tical significance is material and, therefore, legally significant because the legal
issue is whether there is a reasonable basis for the claim. A study showing no
practically significant difference between the efficacy of different drugs is legally
significant to the FTC claim because it fails to support the advertisers' claim.
Thus, while neither the statistical significance nor the practical significance of
quantitative evidence depends upon which party is considering it, the legal signifi-
cance of the results does vary since it may support one party's allegations and
defeat the other's. The results in the Listerine case were statistically significant but
practically insignificant and, as such, lent weight only to the FTC's case because
the differences shown were not large enough to demonstrate Listerine's efficacy.
98. Id at 275.
99. Bristol-Myers Co., No. 8917, slip op. at Finding 392 (F.T.C. Sept. 28, 1979) (available on LEXIS,
FTC library).
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V
GUIDELINES FOR USE OF QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE IN THE THREE
STAGES OF FTC LITIGATION
Guidelines for the use of quantitative evidence in FTC litigation can be based
on the distinction between practical and statistical significance in the data prepa-
ration stage, the prehearing stage, and the litigation stage. The goals to be
attained through these guidelines are simplification and prehearing settlement of
evidentiary and legal issues, cooperation between parties, disclosure of relevant
background materials, and clarification of substantive remedial requirements.
Achievement of these goals will guarantee the integrity of fact-finding in deceptive
advertising cases while intruding in the least restrictive manner on the free flow of
commercial information.
Preparation of data for substantiation of advertising claims or of deception
claims must be guided by sound methodologcal principles emphasizing the need
for the opposing parties and fact finders to: (1) evaluate the design and method of
data gathering and thereby establish the relevance of the results, (2) appreciate the
practical import of the magnitude of the results, and (3) examine the statistical
significance of the quantitative data. The Food and Drug Administration's princi-
ples for adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations might be interpreted
as incorporating these three desiderata by requiring disclosure of objectives,
methods, and controls and by requiring an evaluation of the data and a discussion
of the statistical method employed. The FDA principles might serve as a model
for proposed FTC guidelines for this type of clinical study, although the emphasis
on evaluation of both practical and statistical significance should be made explicit.
The manner in which the experimenter handled a variety of well-recognized fac-
tors, such as the establishment of a control group and subject and experimenter
blindness, influences the extent to which fact finders will believe that the clinical
results support the advertiser's claim. Clinical reports offered by any party might
be justified in terms of the probative force of the empirical results and accompa-
nied by a description of the legal significance of the results, assuming such results
are found to be relevant and credible.
Just as there are well-recognized factors describing appropriate procedures in
clinical studies, there are corresponding factors for surveys and econometric studies
which are well-recognized in the social science literature."t° The experimenter's
inability to control social phenomena is the source of much error. The perceptions
of a television viewer regarding the nutritional benefits of Wonder Bread have
been affected by numerous forces external to the advertiser's control. These forces
contaminate the conclusions of the surveyer just as awareness by a clinical subject
or observer affects the blindness, and therefore the relevance, of a clinical investi-
gation. Litigation guidelines might require that the direction of any bias resulting
100. Oskar Morgenstern observes that "'at least all sources of error that occur in the natural sciences
also occur in the social sciences: or, in other words, the statistical problems of the social sciences cannot
possibly be less serious than those of the natural sciences." 0. MORGENSTERN, ON TIlE A(:(:RA(:Y O-
ECONOMIC OBS -R\ATIONs 7 (2d ed. 1963).
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from uncontrolled factors, and the associated legal significance, be explicitly iden-
tified in the report.
Survey data and data from the party's records frequently do not measure
exactly the phenomenon in which the fact finder or researcher is interested;' 10 the
investigator should note this failure. This problem may be compounded in a situa-
tion when business records are examined, such as the success rates of trade school
graduates, because they are not made specifically for the purpose of trial or for the
particular issue to be examined. The problem of imprecision may also arise when
business records are created for the purpose of litigation due to the potential for
falsification or misleading disclosure of information. In addition, survey data not
taken from a party's records but generated for the party's own use, such as mar-
keting studies made by a marketing agency for a client who is now before the
Commission,102 might not directly address the ultimate issue before the court.
Even if made for the purpose of the litigation, such data might suffer from a lack of
randomness or other design defects associated with questionnaires. 10 3
An explicit evaluation of the appropriateness and adequacy of study or survey
design may be utilized not only in defense against deceptive advertising challenges
by the FTC, but also in the context of a Commission order for substantiation
which follows a finding of deception or, more commonly, a finding that no "rea-
sonable basis" exists for the claims made. 10 4 The need for disclosure and evalua-
tion of methodology is barely implicit in FTC orders requiring substantiation of
claims.
FTC orders to cease deceptive advertising are typified by an order issued to K
Mart, which allegedly misrepresented the performance characteristics, construc-
tion, and structure of its tires.'0 5 K Mart was ordered to cease and desist from:
making, directly or by implication, any statement or representation in any advertising or
sales promotional material as to the performance characteristics, construction or structure
of any automobile tire vended by respondent ... unless at the time of such statement or
representation respondent has a reasonable basis for such statement or representation,
which shall consist of competent scientific tests, or other objective material, and where such
statements or representation includes a comparison to other products, directly or by impli-
cation, such statement or representation shall be supported by competent scaentc tests showing
not less than a ninety-five percent confidence level when subjected to appropriate statistical
analysis. 106
The qualifications for competence of the scientific test are not set forth with as
much particularity as required by the FDA principles or as suggested in this article
as appropriate. While the Commission requires any demonstrated comparison to
be statistically significant at a 95% confidence level, there is no requirement that a
certain degree of practical significance support claims of product superiority. This
practice ignores the case law indicating that negligible practical differences will
101. Id. at 14.
102. See, e.g., California Milk Producers Advisory Bd., 94 F.T.C. 429 (1979).
103. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
104. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 65-74 (1972).
105. K Mart Enters., Inc., 84 F.T.C. 574, 575 (1974).
106. Id at 577 (emphasis added).
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not support an advertiser's claim as it might be deceptive even if true. 107
On occasion, when fault has been found with a particular survey used in an
advertising campaign, the Commission will indicate where the defect in scientific
method lay and order the party to cease and desist from making representations
concerning survey results unless the specific problem is corrected. Thus, in Liton,
where the manufacturer's survey was tainted by the inclusion of potentially biased
subjects, the order required Litton to cease and desist from:
Advertising the results of a survey unless the respondents in such survey are a census or
representative sample of the population referred to in the advertisement, directly or by
implication. A representative sample need not be a probability sample so long as when the
ad is first disseminated respondents have a reasonable basis to expect the sampling method
used would not produce biased results.
0 8
This is a step in the right direction in terms of specificity and clarity of require-
ments regarding the method of data gathering for quantitative evidence to be used
in litigation.
The Commission's failure to specify the degree of proof necessary to show a
material difference between products comparatively advertised, and indeed, the
failure to note that a practically significant difference must be established at all, is
a fault with such orders. No generally applicable standard exists to establish when
practical differences are significant, although standards employed in clinical inves-
tigations may provide some guidance.
Clinical investigators use the property of sample size and statistical significance
to help decide how big a difference is clinically, medically, therapeutically, or
practically significant. Generally, as the sample size of a study increases, a small
difference is increasingly likely to emerge as statistically significant. The Commis-
sion found in Bristol-Myers that "a meaningful way to resolve concerns over the
magnitude of difference necessary for clinical importance is to require statistically
significant differences to be obtained with a reasonable sample size and no
greater."' 1 9 In the past, clinicians appeared to have been willing to find practical
significance in tests of analgesics where statistical significance was found with
twenty to fifty subjects,' 0 the theory being that if a clinically significant difference
is going to show at all, it will show when using that number of subjects.
The clinicians' approach differs greatly from the approach in the Listerine case
when experts merely asserted, though quite plausibly, that cold sufferers would not
be able to notice an improvement in the severity of their coughs from 2.112 to
1.920. 1' The difference, according to the experts' intuition, did not make a differ-
ence clinically.
In a variety of different fields where empirical investigations are made, investi-
gators have developed and formalized their intuition as to what constitutes a prac-
tically significant difference. This is true for fields as diverse as the testing of a
107. Yee supra note 38 and accompanying text.
108. Litton Indus., Inc., 97 F.T.C. 1, 82 (1981).
109. Bristol-Myers Co., No. 8917, slip op. at Finding 393 (F.T.C. Sept. 28, 1979) (available on LEXIS,
FTC library).
110. Id
Il l. Se supra text accompanying note 82.
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variety of drugs pursuant to the FDA standards for adequate and well-controlled
studies'1 2 and the evaluation of the job-relatedness of written examinations in
employment discrimination cases.' 13 The fact finders in these cases rely to varying
degrees on the expertise of empiricists familiar with the field.
In the preparation and presentation of quantitative evidence, it seems reason-
able to expect that a complete report will discuss the degree of difference required
to establish practical significance. Certainly, researchers should decide on a
required degree of practical significance before seeing the results, just as they
decide on a level of statistical significance beforehand. An order from the FTC to
a party accused of deceptive advertising or of having no reasonable basis for a
claim would be correspondingly more useful and clearer to the extent that it speci-
fied such a level of practical significance. Such specificity in orders as well as in
guidelines would help prevent arbitrary and capricious action by the Commission.
The comments to the Data Committee Recommendations 1 4 argue for pretrial
cooperation and disclosure of information. The purpose underlying the recom-
mendation that each party make available to the other documentation of the data
used in its analysis and a report of its expert's data base, method of analysis,
assumptions and conclusions is the same as the purpose served by full revelation of
information in the FDA principles. Without full disclosure of basic data and
assumptions, the process of investigating the meaning of quantitative results is
impeded.
To lawyers, the act of disclosing their objections to data and its analysis is an
awkward one because it necessitates revealing one's strategy to one's opponent
before the battle. The Data Committee Recommendations are also sensitive to
this potential objection.'1 5 It may be that the adversary model is not well suited to
the full development of quantitative evidence. The FTC's hearing process departs
significantly from usual court proceedings in that the commissioners and their
counsel are independent fact finders empowered to investigate beyond the evi-
dence presented by conflicting parties. Hence, the hearing process may more
readily incorporate the Data Committee's recommendations.
A pretrial disclosure rule might be guided by the distinctions between irrele-
vance due to poor methodological design, practical significance, and statistical sig-
nificance. Issues related to the statistical significance of results should certainly be
resolved prior to trial since disagreements between the parties are more likely to
rest on differences in the data, erroneous calculations, or on techniques of statis-
tical analysis than on strategic considerations. On the other hand, given that all
parties are aware of the design and methodology of the underlying study, a lawyer
might reasonably balk at revealing his or her list of design defects which tend to
make the results appear irrelevant. Conflicting views of what constitutes a mate-
rial difference might be resolved during litigation, but identification of the degree
112. Bristol-Myers Co., No. 8917, slip op. at Finding 395.
113. See, e.g., Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 371 F. Supp. 507 (D. Mass. 1974), aff'd, 504
F.2d 1017 (tst Cir. 1974),cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
114. See Data Committee Recommendations, supra note 6.
115. Id
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of difference might be an appropriate subject for pretrial agreement and
stipulation.
In sum, the thesis here is that structuring debate over disclosure along the lines
of relevance, practical significance, and statistical significance may be fruitful in
the resolution of deceptive advertising cases. The fact finder will benefit from
organizing the quantitative evidence along these lines in order to simplify and
structure the statistical analysis, clarify the resolution of factual issues addressed by
quantitative evidence, and clarify substantive remedial requirements through
more specific orders to advertisers.

